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Abstract 
Problem Statement: 
There is no comprehensive tool capturing general vulnerability to biases caused by the use of heuristics. Existing tools focus 
only on one specific bias or on personality traits. 
Research Questions: 
Can general vulnerability to heuristic thinking be assessed and what are the sub-dimensions of this construct? Can 
undergraduate students be successfully involved in the research process? 
Purpose of the Study: 
To demonstrate the results of an educational experiment in which undergraduate students are involved in the first stage of 
development of the Heuristics and Biases Scale (HBS). 
Research Methods: 
After getting acquainted with the underlying theory, students chose one specific bias or heuristic, investigated related results 
of the experiments and paradigms. At the later stage, under supervision, students developed items intended to capture the 
chosen bias. Finally, positively evaluated items were combined together and piloted. The psychometrical properties of the 
items and course outcomes were assessed. 
Findings: 
Developed items formed scales with satisfactory reliability.  Course received positive student evaluations, and the assessment 
indicated that the majority of students achieved intended learning outcomes. 
Conclusions: 
The study indicates that it is possible to develop a psychometrically sound assessment to measure vulnerability to a range of 
common cognitive biases. Moreover, it is also possible to successfully involve undergraduate students in the development of a 
psychometrical tool.  
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1. Introduction  
According to classic normative model of rational choice, when a choice has to be made, the expected utility of 
each option can be calculated given the probabilities and utilities of all possible outcomes of each option as the 
weighted average of the utilities of the outcomes. A rational actor making a decision should choose the option 
maximizing the expected utility (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Obviously, excluding simple gambling 
problems, complete rationality defined in the above way is unachievable for human beings. Firstly, in case of 
most real life decisions the list of potential consequences of each option is very long, if not infinite, with many 
unknowns. Secondly, probabilities of various outcomes are usually not known and at best they can be only 
roughly estimated. Herbert Simon (1957) coined the term bounded rationality to describe limitations set by 
human’s computational and deliberative capacity on rationality of decision making. He argued that we seek to 
find satisfying solutions rather than optimal. Social psychologists went even further claiming that people often 
behave like cognitive misers trying to save cognitive resources by using as little information as possible to reach 
a conclusion and only if motivated opt for more elaborated cognitive strategies (Fiske and Taylor, 1991).  
The distinction between deliberate, strenuous, conscious mental processes and automatic processes requiring 
much less cognitive resources has been well described by a group of psychological theories described collectively 
as dual process theory (Evans, 2011). Independently on whether there are two discrete modes of reasoning 
(Sloman, 1996) or a continuum between implicit and explicit processes (Osman, 2004), there might be individual 
differences in relying on these two modes of reasoning (Stanovich & West, 2000). These differences might for 
instance be due to differences in cognitive abilities (Stanovich & West, 2000, Sattler, Hellix, & Neher, 1970) or 
to differences in preferred cognitive style and motivation (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Petty, DeMarree, Brinol, 
Horcajo, & Strathman, 2008).  Kahneman (2011) refers to dual-processing as two system thinking, with System 1 
corresponding to intuitive unintentional, involuntary, and effortless, automatic thinking, and System 2 is 
responsible for reflective, controlled, conscious effort consuming large amount of  mental energy and being 
limited by capacity of working memory.   
According to Kahneman, errors in judgment produced by System 1 are not random. Theory proposed by 
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) suggested that the process guiding intuitive judgment is not just an incomplete 
version of the rational model of judgment that could be executed by System 2. They postulated that judgments 
made by System 1 are qualitatively different, since they are made using different algorithms than judgments 
made by System 2. System 1 substitutes harder questions by simpler in order to produce solutions.  In other 
words, System 1 relies on a limited number of heuristics - highly efficient mental shortcuts, which reduce 
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simple judgmental operations. Even though the 
use of heuristics most of the time provides a satisfying answer, it also leads to systematic biases. The nonrandom 
nature of the departures from the normative rational theory demonstrated in many experiments has been treated 
as an indicator of the existence of underlying heuristics producing these errors (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002). 
According to Kahneman (2011), there is also a certain degree of control over the mode of decision making. 
While System 1 is usually a default way of processing, one can make a decision to switch to System 2 in attempt 
to correct for these biases.  This also suggests that there might be individual differences in the extent to which we 
rely on System 1 and System 2, due to personal preferences.  
2. Problem  
Even though System 1 judgments based on heuristics provide answers of sufficient quality for most everyday 
decisions, they may also lead to serious errors. Unfortunately, there is ample evidence that people rely on 
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heuristics also in case of decisions having extremely significant consequences, for instance: large investments 
(O’Donnell & Schultz, 2005), court sentences (e.g. Danziger, Levar and Avnaim-Pesso, 2011; Sigall and 
Ostrove, 1975), and medical decisions (e.g. Marewski & Gigerenzer, 2012). In this context, it is really relevant to 
be able to evaluate an individual’s susceptibility to cognitive biases. To authors best knowledge there is no 
behaviorally based measurement tool assessing this susceptibility. The closest existing tools are IQ tests 
measuring cognitive capacity and a self report tool measuring self reported motivation (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). 
Therefore, the purpose of this Study is: 1) to establish whether different biases indeed reflect consistent 
individual differences in general tendency to rely on System 1, or each particular heuristic or bias is fairly 
independent, and 2) to determine whether it is possible to develop a measurement tool which measures 
individuals’ vulnerability to cognitive biases. Originally, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) proposed three main 
heuristics responsible for the systematic bias of judgment: availability heuristic, representativeness heuristic, and 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic. Later, in order to accommodate for the unquestionable pivotal role affective 
judgment plays in decision making (e.g. Damasio, 1994), affect heuristic (Slovic at al., 2002) has been added to 
the list and incorporated to the theory (Kahneman 2011).  
Kahneman (2011) postulated that several cognitive biases can be attributed to each heuristic. For instance, 
availability heuristic, which allows the actor to use ease of retrieval to estimate the frequency of a class or the 
probability of an event, can lead to availability bias and to the phenomenon of rare events bias. In case of both 
biases, the probability of events which can be easily retrieved from the memory is systematically overestimated. 
Therefore, recent and vivid events may have a disproportionate impact on decisions.    
In the representativeness heuristic, the resemblance of an object to the prototype serves as a proxy for 
estimating probabilities. The use of this heuristic can produce biases like: conjunction fallacy, base rate 
negligence, and gamblers fallacy. In all of these biases, estimation of the likelihood is biased because people to 
large degree base their judgment on information about the similarity of the evaluated event to the prototype. 
Opposite to formal logic, in case of conjunction fallacy, the chance of occurrence of a target with one unlikely 
feature is rated lower than the chance of occurrence of a target with the same unlikely feature plus one likely 
feature (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). For instance, a white crow with two wings is rated more probable than a 
white crow. In base rate negligence (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1972; 1983Bar-Hillel, 1980), participants in 
experiments overestimate the chance that a target belongs to a relatively rare category if it, he or she resembles a 
prototypical member of this category. For instance, somebody who looks like a librarian is most likely a librarian. 
Gamblers fallacy makes people believe that an independent single random outcome will depend on previous 
outcomes in order to make series fit the image of random distribution. For instance, after three tails one expects 
head.    
Anchoring and adjustment heuristic allows us to estimate a value starting from a known position and adjusting 
the value based on facts that come to mind. Unfortunately, if the original anchor is off, adjustment is usually not 
sufficiently big, which leads to a bias.  
Reliance on feelings associated with these affective responses in judgment has been defined as the affect 
heuristic. Almost any potential characteristic of a person or object has a certain affective valence. Thanks to 
affect heuristic, when people need to evaluate any property of the target, they can substitute the property in 
question with general affective evaluation of the target (Slovic, et al. 2002). The most well known bias related to 
this heuristic is halo effect (Thorndike, 1920; Asch, 1946). In the halo effect, one vivid characteristic of a person 
determines how this person is judged on all unrelated characteristics. For example, a beautiful person is perceived 
as kind. According to Tversky (2011), the use of judgmental heuristics is synonymous with automatic System 1 
processing. For, heuristics replace estimating characteristics (like probability) requiring elaborate formal thinking 
by estimates of characteristics automatically and effortlessly provided by System 1:  similarity, ease of recall and 
affective value.   
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If the assumption that cognitive biases are a product of relying on an automatic processing style is correct, it 
should be possible to evaluate the general reliance on automatic system 1 processing by the amount and intensity 
of judgmental biases demonstrated by an individual. 
In the presented research, the initial development of the items constituting cognitive bias scales has been 
carried out as a part of problem based learning (PBL, Barrows 1996) by students in the intermediate level 
psychology class. Aim was to test whether undergraduate university college students can be successfully 
involved in academic research this way, to the benefit of both students and research. 
 
3. Research Method  
As was mentioned before, the purpose of the study was: 1) to develop and pilot the scales to assess 
individual’s reliance on heuristics and vulnerability to cognitive biases and 2) to pilot the procedure of involving 
university college students in the development and to enhance their learning through PBL (Barrows 1996). In this 
approach, students start with the problem, then work in a peer group to explain the problem and to construct the 
needed knowledge. Meanwhile, the teacher provides the framework for it. Later, the students work on their 
individual solution and then regroup at the end to share their findings. To reduce issues related to potential excess 
of cognitive load in the initial stage of PBL (Sweller, 1988), in this project, students initially got acquainted with 
the general underlying theory and heuristics and biases approach (Kahneman, 2011) and chose one specific bias 
or heuristic to study. In the next stage, they wrote a short essay summarizing the processes postulated to be 
involved in the bias. Moreover they investigated related results of experiments and experimental paradigms used 
to demonstrate the chosen bias. At this time, they were also confronted with the problem of creating a test item 
taping into the selected heuristic or bias, and they attempted to produce an initial solution. Next, based on their 
choices, they were assigned to workgroups of three to four people and worked together towards the goal of 
developing a handful of fully functional items. This process, guided by the framework provided by the teacher, 
took several stages in which students worked individually and in the workgroups to polish and exchange 
feedback on their items under supervision. During these stages, students were also given the necessary 
psychometrical background. Finally, after a pilot of studying individual items, students in each group selected the 
best items intended to capture the chosen bias. Finally, items positively evaluated on their face validity were 
combined with other items developed by researchers and piloted. Finally, an assessment was carried out of both 
the enhancement of learning by students as well as the developed scales.  
The problem based learning project was evaluated based on self-reported learning outcomes. At the end of the 
project, besides a regular course evaluation form, students filled a short self report questionnaire. In this self 
report questionnaire, they could indicate if the HBS project reached its learning objectives and they could 
indicate if, given the opportunity, they would like to develop their work on HBS further. Psychometrical 
properties of the items were assessed based on the results of the pilot.  
The group of students involved in the development of the scales consisted of a regular class of 25 English 
speaking students of a Dutch residential university college. The students were mostly in their second year of 
undergraduate honors program. Before being elected to do the second year level intermediate psychology course, 
they had already successfully completed an introductory psychology course and a methodology and statistics for 
social sciences course. 
The pilot questionnaire including the items based on the students’ work contained three parts. The first part 
concerned the demographical background of the participant. The second part included 59 heuristics and biases-
related items. Each item consisted of one up to three interconnected questions, which were combined to produce 
one unique item score. The biases-related questions covered the following biases: Hindsight bias, Conjunction 
fallacy, Planning fallacy, Halo effect, Phenomenon of rare Events, Overconfidence bias, and Susceptibility to 
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priming. Items concerning Gamblers fallacy, Availability bias, Anchoring bias and Sunk cost fallacy were 
abandoned due to dissatisfactory properties.  
After the first small scale pilot, an adjusted final questionnaire was distributed to a convenience sample of 
respondents. The questionnaire was distributed in several clusters in order to diversify the sample. The clusters 
included: high school students, elderly house residents, students of University College, relatives and 
acquaintances of students participating in the class.  
The questionnaire was either handed out in a paper form and collected later, or filled under supervision on the 
spot, or it was delivered and returned by email. All participants received the questionnaire with the explicit 
instruction to fill it in individually without asking for help. Completing the questionnaire took approximately 45 
minutes on average. 
Out of the 163 questionnaires that were distributed, 128 complete samples were collected. In the sample, 
gender was not equally distributed, for the sample consisted in 63.5% of female participants. The average age of 
the participants was equal to 25.91 years (S=13.44) and ranged from 15 to 60 years. The majority of the sample 
(65.7%) consisted of  students.   
The analysis will be presented in two parts. The first part describes the results of the questionnaire considering 
students’ learning experience. The latter part concerns initial psychometrical evaluation of the produced items by 
analysis of their distribution, intercorrelations, reliability, and exploratory factor analysis. 
4. Findings  
4.1. Learning Experience 
Evaluation of learning objectives of the course in the self report (see Table 1) indicated that, in students 
reports, the project met its learning objectives. Each item concerning a learning objective received a statistically 
significant (p<.005) positive answer on average. Learning from peers also received significantly (p=.011) 
positive evaluation. Among students, 40% agreed that given the opportunity they would like to develop their 
work further.  
 
Table 1. Students Evaluations of course objectives (1- strongly disagree, 7-strongly agree) 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
learned about biases and heuristics influencing human decision making 5.80 1.24 
learned how cognitive biases manifest themselves in practice 5.50 1.05 
I learned how to communicate about cognitive biases and heuristics 5.00 1.26 
I gained a better understanding of limitations to our rationality 5.85 0.88 
I learned a lot from my fellow students (discussing the items together, listening to the 
presentations and reviewing their papers) 4.85 1.35 
I gained interest in our cognitive processes 5.50 1.10 
Note: N=20,    
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4.2. Heuristics and biases tool  
From the initial pool of 39 items with satisfactory face validity, items were selected for the factor analysis 
only if there were at least two of them concerning the same cognitive bias and only if they correlated at least .25 
with at least one other item, suggesting reasonable factorability. This procedure left 23 items related to 
vulnerability to priming, hindsight bias, conjunction fallacy, planning fallacy, halo effect and phenomenon of rare 
events. 
Screening revealed that the data was suitable for factor analysis. The minimum amount of data for factor 
analysis was satisfied, with a final sample size of 128 (using list-wise deletion), providing a ratio of over 5 cases 
per variable. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .53, which renders the data acceptable 
for factor analysis, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (253) = 766.50, p < .001). For all items, 
measures of sampling adequacy and the communalities were all acceptable above .5 and .4 respectively (see 
Table 2), later confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Due to exploratory 
nature of the study, principal components analysis has been chosen to identify factors underlying the set of items. 
One (System 1 thinking), two (heuristics), and six (biases) factors solutions were theoretically supported. Initial 
eigen values indicated that the first factors explained 12%, 10.5%, 9.5%, 8.5%, 7.5%, 6.2%, 5.7% of the variance 
respectively. The analysis of eigen values on the scree plot indicated leveling off after five, seven factors; and 11 
factors. The 11 factor solution was rejected because last factors yielded eigen values below 1.0 and the small 
number of variables per factor. The five factor solution failed to assign primary loadings to all items. The seven 
factor solution, which explained 59.7% of the variance has been chosen as a result. There was no difference 
between the orthogonal and non orthogonal rotation in terms of assignment of items to components and of clarity 
of the assignment, thus varimax rotation has been used for the final solution. Factors extracted by rotated 
solutions had roughly the same explanatory power with the first accounting for 9.8% of total variance and the last 
for 7.2% of variance. All items had primary factor loading or above .4 and no item had a cross-loading above .4.   
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Table 2.  Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal components analysis with varimax rotation for 23 items included in the 
HBS questionnaire (N = 228) 
 
Communality 1 
CF 
2 
PF1 
3 
HB 
4 
PRE 
5 
HE 
6 
PF2 
7 
PRI 
Priming 1 .621       .778 
Priming 2 .704       .796 
Hindsight Bias 2 .604   .739     
Hindsight Bias 3 .613   .768     
Hindsight Bias 4 .458   .635     
Hindsight Bias 5 .418   .466     
Conjunction Fallacy 1 .622 .723       
Conjunction Fallacy 2 .407 ,557       
Conjunction Fallacy 3 ,458 .614       
Conjunction Fallacy 4 .545 .710       
Conjunction Fallacy 5 .535 .685       
Planning Fallacy 1 .687  .820      
Planning Fallacy 2 .481  .631      
Planning Fallacy 3 .682      .796  
Planning Fallacy 4 .642      .553  
Planning Fallacy 6 .768      .848  
Planning Fallacy 7 .693  .813      
Halo Effect 1 .508     .615   
Halo Effect 2 .476     .589   
Halo_Effect 3 .446     .656   
Halo Effect 4 .582     .721   
Phenomenon of rare events 3 .873    .923    
Phenomenon of rare events 4 .918    .942    
Note. Factor loadings < .4 are suppressed. CF-Conjunction Fallacy, PF-Planning fallacy, HB- Hindsight bias, 
PRE- phenomenon of rare events,  HE-halo effect, PRI-Priming. 
 
The analysis revealed a factor structure closely matching the pattern of biases addressed by the items. Thus, 
the 7 factors were given labels corresponding to the biases the items were intended to measure. The items related 
to planning fallacy formed two distinct factors. The first planning fallacy related to fallacy concerning 
underestimating the amount of time and work endeavors consume. The second related to the amount of money 
one spends on it. Internal consistency for each of the scales was examined using Cronbach’s alpha, and median 
inter-item correlation. The alphas were moderate: .60 for priming (2 items, r=.46), .62 for Hindsight Bias (5 
items, r=.28), .60 for Conjunction Fallacy (4 items, r=.26), .69 for Time Planning Fallacy (3 items, r=.39), . 67 
for Money Planning Fallacy (3 items, r=.47) ,. 92 for Phenomenon of rare events (2 items, r=.80). No increases in 
alpha for any of the scales could have been achieved by eliminating any item. The seven factor scores were 
computed as average of corresponding items. The analysis of correlations between the factors revealed two 
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statistically significant (p<.05) correlations: The first between two types of planning fallacy (r=.28), the second 
between priming and halo effect (r=-.20).  
5. Conclusion 
The study had twofold purposes. First, to test whether it is possible to involve undergraduate students in the 
development of a psychometrical tool with benefits to them and the product. The second purpose was to initiate 
the construction of a set of scales allowing for estimation of individuals’ vulnerability to biases and for estimation 
of the use of heuristical thinking.  
The results seem to confirm the educational benefit of the project. However, since the conclusion concerning 
educational benefit is based on self reports and a small sample, rather than a controlled experiment, it should be 
taken with caution.  
The pilot of the measurement tool revealed several interesting results. Firstly, the items addressing biases were 
able to form internally consistent scales. Medians of inter item-correlations for all factors exceeded .25 
suggesting good reliability of individual items (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991). It also suggests  that if 
the number of items in each scale would be increased to a reasonable amount, all scales would reach a 
satisfactory alpha (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Therefore, it can be concluded that biases can be reliably measured 
using the design. It is also worth noting that there were no positive correlations between clusters of items 
addressing different biases. This indicates that there is no support for the existence of underlying common source 
of different biases, like habitual use of System 1 or heuristic (Kahneman, 2011). However, this may be partially 
the outcome of the fact that the used sample of items by no means represents well the complete spectrum of 
known cognitive biases.  
In summary, the results show that developing a scale addressing vulnerability to cognitive biases is possible. It 
can be done by extending the current study in three ways: in terms of the sample size, the number of biases 
addressed, and the number of items per bias.  
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